In this paper we provide evidence from Japan that bears on a general theory of agenda power in legislatures. By agenda power we mean the power to determine: (a) which bills are considered in the plenary session of the legislature and (b) restrictions on debate and amendment to these bills, when they are considered. While a substantial amount of work has focused on the second category of agenda power, including studies of special rules in the US House (e.g., Sinclair forthcoming), (...) closure in the UK House of Commons (e.g., Cox, 1987; Dion, 1997), and the guillotine in the French National Assembly (e.g., Huber, 1996), there is very little on the first and arguably more fundamental sort of agenda power. This agenda power is our focus here, and henceforth when we refer to we shall mean this narrower conception. (shrink)

The present paper develops arguments for the need to formulate the basic theories of physics in terms of a six-dimensional manifold, as opposed to the four-dimensional space-time continuum of conventional theory. Employing a purely classical approach, some of the dynamical consequences of such a formulation with regard to both electrodynamics and gravitation are evaluated. The results lead to interesting implications with regard to various questions such as the occurrence and importance of superluminal particles, the existence of two or more physically (...) distinct time scales, and the variation of the gravitational coupling constant G and the law of energy conservation. The analysis also suggests a physical interpretation of the additional coordinates that occur in the metric. (shrink)

Burke proved that the generalized nonstationary ideal, denoted by NS, is universal in the following sense: every normal ideal, and every tower of normal ideals of inaccessible height, is a canonical Rudin‐Keisler projection of the restriction of NS to some stationary set. We investigate how far Burke's theorem can be pushed, by analyzing the universality properties of NS with respect to the wider class of ‐systems of filters introduced by Audrito and Steila. First we answer a question of Audrito and (...) Steila, by proving that ‐systems of filters do not capture all kinds of set‐generic embeddings. We provide a characterization of supercompactness in terms of short extenders and canonical projections of NS, without any reference to the strength of the extenders; as a corollary, NS can consistently fail to canonically project to arbitrarily strong short extenders. We prove that ω‐cofinal towers of normal ultrafilters, e.g., the kind used to characterize I2 and I3 embeddings, are well‐founded if and only if they are canonical projections of NS. Finally, we provide a characterization of “ is Jónsson” in terms of canonical projections of NS. (shrink)

In her valuable book Hiding from humanity: Disgust, shame and the law, Nussbaum says that she reaches many of the same practical conclusions as Mill. But she argues that Mill’s conceptions of liberty, justice, and respect for rival ideas of the good and for religious belief, are defective, and further that they do not provide as adequate a basis for the form of political liberalism she recommends. Actually, the alleged defects in Mill rest largely on misrepresentations, but more importantly, once (...) one understands the central role of Mill’s account of justice in shaping his view of liberty and morality, it becomes clear that he offers a better response to cultural pluralism. His way of relating the morality and the aesthetics of conduct embodies a kind of respect for diversity both deeper and more realistic than that claimed for political liberalism. Mill brings a heritage from the Enlightenment in the light of which political liberalism looks like a failure of nerve. (shrink) -/- John Stuart Mill in 19th Century Philosophy Justice, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy. (shrink)

Properly speaking, money and law are natural outgrowths of human society, evolving over time via the voluntary cooperation that lies at the heart of the social enterprise. And as gold and the golden rule have for millennia formed the basis, respectively, of society’s money and law, they accordingly constitute the “twin pillars of civilization,” governing the social enterprise such that, in Mises’s words, “the human species has multiplied far beyond the margin of subsistence.” It stands to reason, then, that if (...) money and law are corrupted, the social enterprise will be corrupted as well. And as this is precisely what the state has done, essentially toppling the twin pillars of civilization, it is necessary to understand what the state is, where it came from, and how it has systematically gone about corrupting money and law, and thus the social enterprise as a whole. For only then can money and law be returned to their rightful owners, and only then can the state be put in its proper place. Which is no place so far as the proper functioning of civil society is concerned. (shrink)

After some general remarks about the interrelation between philosophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance tests. These are defined as the calculation of p-values rather than as formal procedures for ‘acceptance‘ and ‘rejection‘. A number of types of null hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out governing the implications of p- values in the specific circumstances of each application, as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A number of more complicated situ- ations are discussed (...) in which modification of the simple p-value may be essential. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: Consistent with constructivism, phenomenology attempts to ground knowledge in an understanding of subjectivity. Although the phenomenological method can serve as a source of new insights and important critique of the conventional modes of understanding, the method’s effectiveness in the context of justification remains problematic.

The concept of human dignity is widely used in contemporary ethics and law as a foundational criterion for moral reasoning. Nonetheless, the concept has recently received criticism from various quarters. Some of this criticism has come from representatives of the animal liberation movement. The concept of human dignity is accused of underpinning an ethics that is anthropocentric and speciesist. That is, human dignity is said to be used as the basis of an ultimately unjustifiable attribution of intrinsic moral worth only (...) to human beings and to lead, consequently, to a detrimental prejudice against other species. (shrink)